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**REPORT OF THE CHAIRPERSON OF THE COMMISSION**  
**ON THE SITUATION IN THE DARFUR REGION OF THE SUDAN**

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**I. INTRODUCTION**

1. Paragraph 8 of the decision adopted by the 17<sup>th</sup> meeting of the Peace and Security Council (PSC), held on 20 October 2004, requested the Commission to report regularly on the situation in Darfur and the operations of the enhanced African Mission in the Sudan (AMIS), with a view to making further proposals as deemed necessary, in order to enhance the effectiveness of the Mission on the ground.

2. The present report is submitted pursuant to that decision. It covers military, security, political, humanitarian and human rights developments since my last report of 20 October 2004 [PSC/PR/2(XVII)].

**II. DEPLOYMENT OF THE ENHANCED AMIS**

3. At its 17<sup>th</sup> meeting, the PSC endorsed the proposals made by the Commission, as reviewed by the 1<sup>st</sup> Meeting of the Military Staff Committee (MSC) at the level of the Chiefs of Defence Staff, held in Addis Ababa, on 18 – 19 October 2004, on the enhancement of AMIS. In this respect, the PSC decided that AMIS shall consist of 3,320 personnel, including 2,341 military personnel, among them 450 observers; up to 815 civilian police personnel; as well as the appropriate civilian personnel. The PSC requested me to take all necessary steps to expedite the implementation of the enhancement of AMIS and, in this respect, to explore all possibilities for shortening the timeframe envisaged, including the emergency deployment of personnel, to ensure that the requirements for an effective presence on the ground are met as early as possible. It should be recalled that, based on the proposals submitted to the PSC, the deployment of the enhanced AMIS was to be completed within 120 days following the issuance of a mandate.

4. Over the past months, sustained efforts have been made by the Commission, with the assistance of AU Partners, to expedite the deployment of AMIS and enhance its logistical capability. In spite of the progress made, much more needs to be done if the deployment is to be completed with the urgency required by the evolving complexity of the situation on the ground.

**A) Status of the Military Deployment**

5. As at 9 January 2005, the CFC (Ceasefire Commission) and AMIS had a total of 1162 personnel (almost triple the strength of the Mission in early October 2004, i.e. 465), composed as follows:

a) CFC Headquarters (El Fasher)

- Chairman (African Union - AU)	1
- Vice-Chairman (European Union - EU)	1
- AU Representative	1
- Chadian Mediation	2
- Government of the Sudan (GoS) Representative	2
- Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) Representative	2
- Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) Representative	2
Total	11

b) Military Observers (MILOBs)

i) From the AU

- Algeria	3
- Congo	15
- Egypt	33
- Gabon	10
- Gambia	20
- Ghana	24
- Kenya	30
- Mali	15
- Mozambique	5
- Namibia	4
- Nigeria	44
- Rwanda	10
- Senegal	23
- South Africa	9
- Malawi	15
- Zambia	15
- Mauritania	10
Total	285

ii) From the Chadian Mediation	18
iii) From the Sudanese Parties	36
iv) From the EU	10
v) From the US	7
Total	71

c) Protection Force:

i)	Nigeria	202
ii)	Rwanda	392
iii)	Gambia	<u>196</u>
	Total	790

As this report was being finalized, two companies from Nigeria (392) and one company (196) from Senegal were expected to be deployed by the first week of January 2005.

d) Support Staff (International and local): 12

e) Civilian Police: 7

Seven (7) of the fifteen (15) members of the advance team have arrived in the mission area. The team has conducted a preliminary reconnaissance mission, and has worked out the deployment plan for the civilian police. Some Member States have been approached to provide the personnel required for the initial deployment, and it is expected that 400 civilian police from Ghana, Egypt, Nigeria and South Africa will be on the ground by the end of January 2005.

**B) Organizational, Logistical and Financial Aspects**

6. As indicated in my earlier report, the military and the Civilian Police Headquarters of AMIS are located in El Fasher, which is also the Headquarters for Sector 1. There are seven other Sectors located as follows: Nyala (Sector 2), El Geneina (Sector 3), Kabkabiyah (Sector 4), Tine (Sector 5), Kutum (Sector 6), Zalinguei (Sector 7) and El Daien (Sector 8).

7. Following the decision to enhance AMIS, I appointed, on 10 November 2004, Ambassador Baba Gana Kingibe, who was until then my Special Envoy for the North-South Dialogue in Kenya, as my Special Representative in Sudan. In that capacity, his role is to ensure the overall direction and coordination of the activities of the Mission and to maintain close contacts with the Sudanese Parties, as well as the UN and all other concerned actors. Amb. Kingibe has already assumed duties in Khartoum, and is in regular contact with the Sudanese Parties and members of the international community, including the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative, Jan Pronk.

8. I have also appointed Major General Festus Okonkwo from Nigeria, who is chairing the CFC, as the Force Commander, with Brigadier General Jean

Bosco Kazura of Rwanda as Deputy Force Commander. South Africa has been requested to provide the Head of the AMIS Civilian Police component; Ghana has already provided the Deputy Head of the Civilian Police component. Furthermore, and in order to backup the Mission with strategic planning and management support, a team known as the Darfur Integrated Task Force (DITF) has been established at the AU Commission.

9. AMIS currently has a total of 202 vehicles, and has signed a contract with a procurement agency for the delivery of an additional 575 vehicles. The Canadian Government has agreed to provide eighteen helicopters, six of which have already been delivered. The rest of the helicopters will be delivered in January 2005. The Dutch Government has also leased three helicopters for the Mission. In addition, the AU is in the process of leasing four fixed wing aircraft. With the expansion of the Mission, steps have been taken to purchase additional communication equipment.

10. The current budget estimate for the enhanced AMIS, the Inter-Sudanese Peace Talks in Abuja and DITF is \$ 221,767,565, \$1,881,500, and \$3,646,379, respectively. This brings the total estimate to \$ 227,295,443. I should, however, add that the budget is in the process of being revised. As at 31 December 2004, a total of \$ 190,580,182.49 has been pledged by AU Partners, as follows:

-	Canada:	US\$ 15,037,593.98
-	Denmark:	US\$ 750,000.00
-	European Union:	US\$ 101,673,794.44
-	France:	US\$1,730,600.00
-	Germany:	US\$ 1,311,700.00
-	Italy:	US\$ 554,000.00
-	Japan:	US\$ 2,600,000.00
-	Netherlands:	US\$ 6,506,959.02
-	Norway:	US\$ 1,000,000.00
-	Sweden:	US\$ 625,000.00
-	United Kingdom:	US\$ 18,404,000.00
-	USA:	US\$ 40,386,485.05
	Total	US\$ 190,580,182.49

### **III. ACTIVITIES OF THE CFC/AMIS AND SECURITY SITUATION**

11. In its decision of 20 October, Council mandated the enhanced AMIS to monitor and observe compliance with the N'djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement of 8 April 2004 and all such agreements in the future; to assist in the process of confidence-building; and to contribute to a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian relief and the return of refugees and IDPs.

During the period under review, the CFC and AMIS have continued to perform their respective mandates amidst a very tense situation on the ground.

12. The month of October was characterized by an increase in motor vehicle snatching, ambushing, kidnapping of civilians and looting of livestock. Most of these acts were committed by elements belonging to the SLM/A. The activities of the Janjaweed and other militias, which reduced in the first half of October 2004, increased in the third week of that month. Under the pretext of searching for looted livestock and abducted persons, they went on a rampage of killing, looting, raping young girls and abducting innocent civilians, all said to be in response to alleged abduction of some Arabs by SLM/A elements. Also, in the month of October, the GoS, which had exercised restraint in the face of acts of provocation by the Movements, began roads patrols and, in some cases, air patrols, using violence where necessary, particularly in Juruf and Labenti areas. The GoS forces went further and established several new camps, thus violating the ceasefire.

13. In the period under review, a new faction in Darfur called the National Movement for Reform and Development (NMRD) became active in the general area of El-Geneina and Tine, that is, the area between Jebel Moon and Tine. The NMRD is believed to be the Zaghawa breakaway faction of the JEM. The issue of the participation of this movement to the Abuja Talks was raised. However, the AU could not accommodate this request. It is to be noted that JEM and SLM/A had strongly opposed the participation of the NMRD to the Talks. In the meantime, an agreement was signed between the Gos and the NMRD, under the auspices of Chad.

14. The security incidents and other acts of violence witnessed in October continued in the month of November in spite of the commitments entered into by the Parties under the Protocols on Humanitarian and Security Issues signed in Abuja on 9 November 2004. The most serious security incidents that occurred were related to the town of Tawilla, which fell to SLM/A forces on 22 November 2004. Subsequently, the GoS forces launched a counter-offensive, supported by Antonov 26 and helicopters, ultimately recapturing Tawilla. At the same time, the SLM/A forces attacked the Kalma IDP camp, while militiamen supported by the GoS, employing its air assets, attacked Adwah village. These incidents affected several civilians. It should also be added that a Chadian MILOB was shot on the right shoulder by a rocket bullet from the Adwah.

15. In December the situation, instead of improving, became even more tense. On 8 December, the GoS decided to clear the roads of SLM/A road blocks and bandits and started a massive build up of forces in Southern Darfur. Subsequently, and in spite of an appeal by my Special Representative to the Minister of Foreign Affairs to call off the GoS military action in view of

the impending Abuja Talks slated for 10 December, the GoS troops attacked Marlla and Ishma. The SLM/A forces, which had withdrawn from Marlla, were reported to have later attacked a GoS police convoy at Umm and ambushed motor vehicles of Save the Children (UK), killing two humanitarian workers. Also, Janjaweed/armed militias were reported to have looted and burnt villages, including Hashaba and Um Zaifa, the worst being the sacking of Konkono village in the very presence of GoS soldiers.

16. A week after the GoS forces started their December offensive, precisely on 13 December 2004, the Commander of the Western Area Command sent a letter to the CFC, restating the resolve of the Government to open and secure the roads linking the different cities as well as to provide security to the citizens. He further asked the CFC to request the SLM/A to vacate within four days the 41 camps occupied by the Movement after the N'djamena Agreement of 8 April 2004. On 16 December, a brigade size force of GoS resumed its advance, and is now deployed 8 Km West of Labado. On 19 December, an AMIS helicopter was shot at, from the village of Labado - none was hurt and the helicopter landed safely

17. On 10 December, I urged the Parties to put an immediate end to all hostilities and to abide by the Agreements they have signed. I also indicated that the Commission would bring any serious violation to the attention of the PSC and the UN Security Council, as appropriate. On 18 December, and in view of the continued deterioration of the situation on the ground and its negative impact on the Abuja Peace Talks convened at the time, I strongly condemned the acts committed by the Parties. In particular, I condemned the military operation launched by the GoS, as it contributed to undermining the negotiation process.

#### **IV. MEETINGS OF THE JOINT COMMISSION**

18. In the period under review, the Joint Commission (JC) provided for by the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement of 8 April 2004 held three meetings, on 25 November 2004, in N'djamena, on 17 December 2004, in Abuja, on the margins of the Fourth Round of the Inter-Sudanese Peace Talks, and on 3-4 January 2005 in N'djamena. At the first meeting in N'djamena, the JC adopted its Rules of Procedure. In the Conclusions adopted at the end of the meeting, the Parties were requested to exercise control over their forces in order to put an end to attacks on innocent civilians and their properties; to stop all offensive acts and refrain from establishing new military camps; and to effectively fulfil their commitments within one month, including the provision of information on the locations of their respective forces and the disarmament of the Janjaweed/armed militias.

19. The meeting of the JC of 17 December 2004 demanded that the GoS stop its military operations and withdraw its forces to its pre-8 December 2004 positions. Similarly, it demanded that the Movements refrain from any attacks against commercial convoys, as well as government infrastructure, including police stations. A deadline expiring on 18 December, at 18h00, was given to the Parties to comply with the demands of the JC. The meeting further urged the Parties to fully implement the commitments they made during the session held in N'djamena on 25 - 26 November 2004.

20. At its meeting of 3-4 January 2005 in N'djamena, the JC noted with regret that the cycle of violations of the N'djamena Ceasefire Agreement and subsequent Agreements were responsible for the difficulties encountered during the last round of the Abuja Talks held in December 2004. The violations also contributed to the inability of the CFC to fully discharge its responsibilities. In order to pave the way for the resumption of the Abuja Talks, the JC requested the GoS to withdraw its forces from Marlla, Ishma and Labado, the areas it captured as a result of its December offensive, it being understood that these vacated locations should not be reoccupied by the rebel forces. Further, the GoS was asked to undertake, without further delay, the disarmament of the Janjaweed/Armed militias, as it previously undertook to do. For their part, the Movements were requested to provide the list of the locations of their forces as they had previously undertaken to do so. Finally, while noting generally the cooperation of the GoS in matters relating to the information on the exchange of prisoners, the JC urged the Movements, which have also given information on this matter, to respond to the list provided by the GoS. Should the Parties fail to abide by their commitments, the AU Commission was asked to seize the appropriate AU organs and others.

## **V. STATUS OF THE INTER-SUDANESE PEACE TALKS ON DARFUR**

21. In spite of the deteriorating situation on the ground, efforts by the AU, with the support of its Partners, to find a lasting and comprehensive political settlement to the conflict in Darfur have continued. Council would recall that, during the 2<sup>nd</sup> Round of Talks, held in August/September 2004, a Protocol on the Improvement of the Humanitarian Situation in Darfur was agreed upon but not signed. The Parties also initiated discussions on a Protocol on the Enhancement of the Security Situation in Darfur.

22. The Third Round of the Inter-Sudanese Peace Talks was convened from 21 October to 9 November 2004. During this Round, the Parties signed the Protocol on the Enhancement of the Security Situation and the Protocol on the Improvement of the Humanitarian Situation in Darfur. The Parties also initiated discussions on political issues. Subsequently, a draft Declaration of Principles (DoP) was prepared for the consideration of the Parties. The draft DoP outlines broad principles that should guide the future deliberations of the



Parties, and constitute the basis for a just, comprehensive and durable settlement of the conflict in Darfur. The DoP addresses a number of specific issues, including:

- the need to recognize and accommodate the diversity of the Sudanese society;
- the promotion of democracy, political pluralism and the rule of law, as a basis for the effective participation of all Sudanese citizens in the management of their own affairs;
- the affirmation of citizenship as a basis for civil and political rights, and duties;
- the establishment of a federal system of government, with an effective devolution of powers and a clear distribution of responsibilities between the national and other levels of governance;
- the effective representation in government institutions at national level to ensure full participation by all regions and communities;
- the equitable distribution of the national wealth;
- the need to combat impunity and ensuring that violations of human rights are swiftly and effectively investigated and addressed;
- the need to guarantee the inalienable right of refugees and IDPs to return to their places of origins;
- the need to address security arrangements to consolidate the restoration of peace.

23. The draft DoP was revised twice to take into account additional inputs and observations by the Parties. The GoS accepted the two successive revised versions of the draft DoP, while the Movements put forward additional observations.

24. The Fourth Round of the Inter-Sudanese Peace Talks on Darfur was, therefore, held from 11 to 21 December 2004, in Abuja, essentially to finalise and adopt the DoP. While the GoS was represented at the Talks by a delegation headed by its Chief Negotiator for Darfur, Dr. Magzoub Al Khalifa, the SLM/A was not fully represented as all its senior leaders failed to turn up. The explanation given was that, prior to the commencement of the Talks,

information was received that the forces of GoS had launched a military operation to clear the roads and protect citizens and cities. The SLM/A delegation decided to suspend its participation and demanded that the Government stop its attacks and instruct its forces to return to their previous positions. The JEM, which was represented by its Secretary-General, expressed its willingness to start the political negotiations, while demanding that the GoS stop its military offensive. I should note, however, that even prior to all this, the GoS expressed doubt whether the Movements were committed to attending the Talks.

25. However, and particularly in view of the fact that the Movements had seized on the GoS offensive which had started on 8 December to justify their stand, the AU Mediation Team and international partners demanded that the GoS immediately put an end to the military operation to enable the meeting to proceed. The forces of GoS were also to return to the positions they held before 8 December 2004. Similarly, the two Sudanese Movements were requested to halt all acts that were contrary to the N'djamena Agreement and to allow normal operations on all commercial routes.

26. Despite the efforts exerted by the AU and its international partners, the Parties could not resume the Political Talks during the Fourth Round. In this connection, I wish to acknowledge the efforts made by President Olusegun Obasanjo and the Leader of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Col. Muammar Khaddafi, who, through his Special Envoy, Dr. Ali Treiki, had made proposals to break the deadlock at the Talks, proposals which did not meet the agreement of the movements.

27. I should, however, like to stress that at the end of the meeting, the Parties issued a Joint Statement in which they reaffirmed their commitment to seek a peaceful and negotiated solution to the problems in Darfur under the leadership of the African Union and in accordance with the letter and spirit of the N'djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement and the two Abuja Protocols.

28. In order to create a conducive environment for the next Round of the Talks in Abuja, the GoS reaffirmed its stated commitment to completely stop its military operations in Darfur and to withdraw its forces to previous positions, as to be ascertained and agreed to by the Joint Commission. The SLM/A and JEM also undertook to cease all attacks against humanitarian and commercial activities and to restrain their forces from attacks on government infrastructure, including police posts, and also to withdraw their forces to previous positions, as ascertained and agreed to by the Joint Commission.

29. Finally, the Parties undertook to return to Abuja for the next Round of the Talks, on a date in January 2005, to be confirmed by the African Union, to

adopt the Declaration of Principles (DoP) and to engage in discussions of political as well as other outstanding issues.

## **VI. HUMANITARIAN AND HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION**

30. The humanitarian situation in Darfur remains precarious. According to the United Nations, as at 1 November 2004, the number of conflict-affected persons, including internally displaced persons (IDPs), host communities and others in need of relief, had increased by a further 250,000, to close to 2.3 million.

31. Despite the prevailing security situation, humanitarian agencies were able to increase the overall level of humanitarian assistance delivered. However, food delivery was greatly affected by the increase in insecurity and attacks on convoys, especially in Northern Darfur. I should also like to note that the UN has reported an improvement of the funding levels for humanitarian action in Darfur.

32. Not surprisingly, humanitarian access to the IDPs in Darfur was negatively affected by the increased ceasefire violations by the SLM/A and, to a lesser extent, by the GoS. The UN has reported that, as a result, the humanitarian agencies and NGOs have halted the provision of humanitarian aid, as in the case of Tawilla, where the attack by the SLM/A and the response of the Government forced the suspension of humanitarian activities for about a week, resulting in aid being cut off for 30,000 internally displaced persons. More recently, I was informed that about 260,000 people in Darfur would miss their food rations in the month of January due to a large-scale attack on the town of Ghubaysh, in Western Kordofan, by unidentified rebel groups and the subsequent retaliation by Government forces. The United Nations' World Food Programme (WFP) has now been forced to suspend its relief convoys.

33. Of equal concern is the human rights situation in the region. Among others, it is worth mentioning reports of an increase in the recruitment and control of IDPs by SLM/A and JEM, which is undermining the safety of those populations and that of humanitarian and human rights workers; continued acts of rape and sexual abuses by the Janjaweed/armed militias and other elements; the arrest and intimidation of IDPs, including those who have been in contact with human rights observers and visiting delegations, and instances of forced relocation of IDPs.

34. As part of the efforts to assess the situation on the ground, Mame Madior Boye, my Special Representative for the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflicts in Africa, visited Khartoum and Darfur from 11 to 15 December 2004. She visited IDP camps and held consultations with the

CFC/AMIS, representatives of the GoS, as well as the United Nations. In addition to taking on board her observations and recommendations, I intend to establish, in the Headquarters of AMIS in Khartoum, a unit to specifically deal with the protection of women and children in Darfur.

35. The AU Commission is making efforts to establish the Joint Humanitarian Facilitation and Monitoring Unit in El Fasher as provided under the Protocol on Humanitarian Issues.

36. As part of the efforts to assess the overall situation on the ground, I requested a fact-finding Committee to be established by the Pan African Parliament. That Committee, comprising six Parliamentarians, visited Khartoum and Darfur from 23 to 30 November 2004. It visited IDP camps and held consultations with the CFC/AMIS, representatives of the GoS and of the Movements, members of the Sudanese National Assembly, as well as the United Nations.

## **VII. EFFORTS BY THE UNITED NATIONS AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY**

37. The UN Security Council continues to be seized with the conflict in the Sudan in general, and the crisis in Darfur in particular. During its meetings of 18 and 19 November 2004, in Nairobi, the Security Council adopted resolution 1574 (2004), in which, *inter alia*, it insisted that all Parties to the Abuja Talks negotiate in good faith to reach an agreement speedily. Council further demanded that Government and rebel forces and all other armed groups immediately cease all violence and attacks, including abduction, refrain from forcible relocation of civilians, cooperate with international relief and monitoring efforts, and ensure that their members comply with international humanitarian law, facilitate the safety and security of humanitarian staff and allow unhindered access and passage by humanitarian agencies. The Security Council also expressed strong support for the decisions of the AU to increase its Mission and to enhance its mandate.

38. The International Commission of Inquiry appointed by the UN Secretary-General, in pursuance of resolution 1564(2004), to investigate the acts of violence and atrocities committed in Darfur visited Sudan from 7 to 21 November 2004, where it met senior Government representatives, leaving behind teams of experts remained in the Sudan to conduct further investigations. At the Joint Implementation Mechanism (JIM) – put in place within the framework of the Agreement signed between the UN and the GoS, in early August - meeting of 12 November, the Sudanese Justice Minister assured the members of the international community that: (i) the GoS would accept the report of the Commission whatever its findings, (ii) witnesses of incidents would not be subjected to maltreatment and (iii) no Sudanese

officials would obstruct the Commission's investigations. I am encouraged by these assurances as the work of the Commission is a key aspect of the efforts to end impunity in Darfur. In its resolution 1574 mentioned above, the Security Council called on all the Parties to cooperate fully with the International Commission of Inquiry.

39. On 30 November 2004, the Commissioner for Peace and Security met with Mr. Dumisa Ntebeza and Mr. Mohammed Fayek, two members of the Commission of Inquiry. On that occasion, the Commissioner stressed the importance that the AU attaches to the work of the Commission and its readiness to fully cooperate with the Commission.

40. The follow-up mechanism to the Quintet Summit held in Tripoli on 17 October 2004 was convened by Egypt at Ministerial level in Cairo, on 12 December 2004. The meeting was attended by Libya, Chad, Nigeria and Sudan, as well as the League of Arab States and the AU. The meeting reviewed developments in the Darfur Region since the Tripoli Summit.

## **IX. OBSERVATIONS**

41. In spite of the sustained efforts by the AU with the support of the international community, the situation in Darfur remains grave. The violations of the ceasefire, attacks and other acts of violence against the civilian population have continued unabated. This situation has undermined the ongoing efforts to restore peace and stability to the region, particularly the Abuja Talks.

42. Clearly, every effort has to be exerted to ensure that the commitments entered into by the Parties are fully and scrupulously implemented, particularly in view of the tremendous suffering inflicted on the civilian population. In this respect, necessary pressure should be exerted on the Parties both at the level of the continent and the international community at large, including the Security Council. At the same time, I would like to stress the need for all those in a position to influence the process within and outside the continent to continue to do their utmost to facilitate the peace process and support the ongoing efforts.

43. I should also like to stress that the situation in Darfur is viewed by many as a test case for the African Union, to address issues of peace and security on the continent and for its resolve to stand by the principles enshrined in its Constitutive Act. In this respect, I would like to reiterate the determination of the Commission to bring to the attention of the PSC and the UN Security Council any further serious violations, as appropriate.

44. The large-scale violations of the ceasefire by all Parties constitute a threat to the ongoing efforts. I urge the Parties to fully comply with their obligations and abide by decisions of the Joint Commission.

45. The AU will intensify its efforts to find a lasting solution to the crisis and alleviate the plight of the civilian population. In this respect, the early completion of expansion of the AU Mission on the ground is of particular importance. I appeal to the Member States that have been approached by the Commission to expedite the process of providing military and police personnel to make it possible to complete the deployment in earnest. At the same time, the Commission will continue to look into ways and means of enhancing the effectiveness of the Mission on the ground. Furthermore, all steps will be taken to ensure the early resumption of the Talks.

46. I welcome the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) by the GoS and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army SPLM/A, which took place on the 9 January 2005, in Nairobi. It is my hope that this development will have a positive impact on the ongoing efforts on Darfur. Clearly, the CPA provides a new political dispensation within which the aspirations of all the people of the Sudan, including the people of Darfur, could be addressed.

47. I wish to acknowledge the generous assistance from the AU Partners, which made it possible to deploy and sustain AMIS. I wish to express my gratitude to President Olusegun Obasanjo, Chairman of the AU, for his active role in, and continued commitment to, the promotion of reconciliation and lasting peace in the Sudan. I wish also to commend my Special Representative and AMIS personnel for their efforts.